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The Canadair-I.A.M. Productivity 
Improvement Plan 
David A. Peach 
This paper présents the expérience of Canadair-I.A.M. Pro-
ductivity Improvement Plan. 
Canadair, Ltd., of Montréal, and Lodge 712 of the International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, representing the Company's 
production and maintenance employées, first negotiated a Productivity Im-
provement Plan in 1968. Over the years, a number of changes hâve been 
made in the plan. What follows is the story of that plan: How it was started, 
how it has developed, and how it relates to the union-management relation-
ship at Canadair. 
BACKGROUND 
The Company 
Canadair Limited began in the 1920's as the aircraft division of Cana-
dian Vickers, Ltd. The company assumed a separate identity in 1944 follow-
ing a reorganization brought about by the Canadian Government. In 1947, 
Canadair was acquired by the Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connec-
ticut, forming the basis for the organization that became the General Dyna-
mics Corporation in 1952. In 1976, Canadair was purchased by the Cana-
dian Government as part of a plan for re-structuring the Canadian aero-
space industry. That plan has yet to corne to completion, and Canadair 
remains a government-owned company. Because of the potential for 
restructuring, the relationship with Government appears to be an arms-
length one, with over ail responsibility for the organization vested in a Board 
of Directors. 
Canadair has manufactured a variety of aircraft and aircraft subassem-
blies for both the military and commercial markets. The most significant 
aircraft now in production is the CL-600 Challenger, a third-generation, 
wide-bodied business jet. The Challenger development program began in 
1976, with the first flight in 1978. By the time of first deliveries in 1980, over 
120 of thèse aircraft had been ordered. In 1980, the company acquired sub-
contracts for the Boeing 747SP, the Lockheed P-3C (the Aurora and Orion 
patrol aircraft) and the Boeing 767 Airliner. 
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In considering the company, two factors are important in understan-
ding the development of the Productivity Improvement Plan (P.I.P.). The 
first is the nature of the company's products, which are extremely complex 
pièces of equipment built to very close tolérances. The nature of the product 
is reflected in the manufacturing and assembly opérations: many parts must 
be manufactured (or acquired) and brought together for assembly, with 
assembly taking place within a fairly limited time-span. The second factor is 
the customer, and the fact that over the years the government has been the 
major purchaser of the company's products. 
The Union 
Montréal Aircraft Lodge No. 712 of the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (LA.M.), had over 5,400 members at 
the time the P.I.P. agreement was signed. The union became the bargaining 
représentative of hourly-paid production and maintenance workers at 
Canadair in 1947. Two other unions are certified at Canadair: LA.M. 
Lodge 2235 represents the Plant Guards, and the Canadian Marine 
Officer's Union, a small group of Power, Compressor and Réfrigération 
Room employées. 
The Relationship 
There were no strikes at Canadair after an initial one in 1947, although 
at times, pressure tactics such as slow-downs or refusai to work overtime 
were présent at contract negotiation time. The union leadership was quite 
stable, but that stability began to disappear in 1962. According to the pré-
sent union leadership, the contract negotiated in 1962 was considered to be 
an extremely poor agreement, providing only two to four cents in wage in-
creases. 
Partially as a resuit, in 1964, a new group assumed the leadership of the 
local. The new leadership was comprised of individuals who had been trying 
to get into power for years and who wanted to make many changes. 
As might be expected, the labour-management relationship went 
through a period of some turbulence as the inexperienced, aggressive union 
leadership met with some management résistance. Combined with this were 
attempts by the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN) to gain repré-
sentation rights at Canadair and problems relating to the désire of French 
Canadians to see the workplace completely reflect the Québec milieu in 
which it was located. The 1964 contract negotiations lasted for eight months 
and were climaxed by an 8-week strike. The strike was not totally peaceful, 
as some instances of picket line violence occurred. 
Lodge 712 emerged from the strike several hundred thousand dollars in 
debt. Although the officers were ail re-elected in December of 1965, the 
membership refused to authorize a dues increase that would eliminate the 
local's debt. 
As a resuit of its financial difficulties, the local was put into trusteeship 
by the International Union. The trusteeship lasted for almost a year. In-
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creasing employment at Canadair from 1966 to 1968 meant a larger mem-
bership and increased dues revenue and by the time the next contract nego-
tiations started, the local's financial picture had improved considerably. 
The 1967-68 Negotiations 
As negotiations approached, the local found itself again under pressure 
from the CSN, which was again active in signing up members within the 
local. As part of the effort to resist the CSN's organizing efforts, the local 
attempted to divert the membership's attention from the CSN's overtures to 
contract negotiations. Suggestions for improvements in the contract were 
solicited, and the union asked the company to begin negotiations early. The 
company agreed, and the interest in negotiations, coupled with disenchant-
ment with the CSN following the 1967 Montréal Transit Strike, helped turn 
back the organizing effort. 
In the negotiations, the union needed a good settlement to make sure 
that the CSN was kept at bay. The International felt it had a stake in the 
negotiations and sent a représentative from Canadian headquarters in 
Ottawa to oversee the process. There was also a great deal of membership 
pressure for a cost-of-living escalator clause in the new agreement. The old 
agreement had included a supplementary bonus to cover the expected in-
creases in the cost-of-living resulting from the 1967 World's Fair in 
Montréal. This spécial bonus began in May and disappeared with the end of 
Expo in November. 
The company was aware of thèse pressures. However, it faced other 
pressures as well. Perhaps the strongest was the pressure from its largest 
customer, the Fédéral Government, for increases in productivity. This pres-
sure was not directed solely at Canadair. The Government was making 
many public statements about the need to increase productivity. Direct pres-
sures might be expected by major suppliers to the Government such as 
Canadair. 
For this reason, the company was reluctant to accept the demand for a 
contract that provided for cost-of-living increases. They believed that any 
increases had to be tied to increases in productivity. Given this goal, 
Canadair management explored the possibility of using various plans that 
tied increases in wages to increases in worker productivity. 
The company considered and rejected piece-work plans, profit-sharing 
plans, the Rucker plan, the Scanlon plan, and the Kaiser plan. Thèse plans 
were found wanting for a variety of reasons. The union had historically op-
posed piece-work plans. Thèse plans were expensive to install and to admi-
nister and disagreements over standards were common. The standards for 
the Kaiser, Scanlon, and Rucker plans were difficult to establish, and could 
lead to disagreement. Profit-sharing plans might not hâve provided a pay-
out to employées, at least at certain times. None of the plans seemed quite 
suited to an opération like Canadair which required careful coordination in 
the design, manufacture, and assembly of a huge number of component 
parts. An incentive System which did not hâve the same gênerai impact in ail 
parts of the opération could easily cause the manufacturing and assembly 
opérations to get out of phase and resuit in a loss of efficiency, rather than 
improvement. 
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At this point, the company began to look at performance to schedule as 
an area around which to develop a program to increase productivity. At this 
time, work on two of the major contracts at Canadair was behind schedule. 
Although this was in part due to conditions beyond the control of Canadair, 
not producing to schedule had serious implications for the company. Delays 
meant that increasing amounts of working capital were tied up. Also, deliv-
eries not made by promised delivery dates meant that the company incurred 
financial penalties, which reduced profits. Finally, the company reduced its 
attractiveness as a supplier by not meeting delivery dates — particularly in 
terms of the manufacture of subassemblies. Delays on thèse items meant 
that the customer's final assembly and delivery were affected. 
The company decided to develop a plan which provided a bonus as ac-
tual production time moved closer to scheduled production time. The idea 
was presented to the union as a substitute for a cost-of-living clause during 
negotiations, and eventually the union agreed to it — along with a wage set-
tlement similar to that being negotiated elsewhere in Canadian manufac-
turing. The new contract also contained another novel feature: an "honour 
system" of clocking out. Employées had to punch-in on the time clocks, but 
did not hâve to punch out. At the time the contract was signed, the principle 
of the plan was accepted but the exact amount of bonus payments for spé-
cifie increases in on-schedule performance had not been determined. 
The plan was called the Productivity Improvement Plan —- or P.I.P. 
for short. In French, the plan was called, Plan d'amélioration de la produc-
tivité or P.A.P. Exhibit I présents a summary of P.I.P. bonus payments 
from 1968 through 1980. The parties agreed that efforts were needed to in-
crease productivity and that employées should share in the benefits from 
such improvements. Productivity increases were to be measured by the ratio 
of "completed behind-schedule production position" to "a schedule posi-
tion norm". Maximum payment was to be twelve cents per hour, and pay-
ment was to be made to ail employées twice a year. A joint committee was 
set up to implement and administer the plan. 
EXHIBIT I 
Summary of Average Semi-Annual P.I.P. Bonus Payments 
1968-1980 
JULY $ 19.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $ 40.00 per employée 
JULY $ 56.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $ 71.00 per employée 
JULY $ 86.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $ 94.00 per employée* 
JULY $121.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $140.00 per employée 
JULY $168.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $200.00 per employée 
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1973 JULY $242.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $249.00 per employée 
1974 JULY $253.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $265.00 per employée* 
1975 JULY $425.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $429.00 per employée 
1976 JULY $451.32 per employée 
DECEMBER $461.83 per employée* 
1977 JULY $553.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $338.73 per employée** 
1978 JULY $500.45 per employée 
DECEMBER $514.45 per employée* 
1979 JULY $581.60 per employée 
DECEMBER $650.00 per employée* 
1980 JULY $700.00 per employée 
DECEMBER $700.00 per employée 
INITIAL OPERATION OF THE PLAN 
The joint committee took three months to work out the détails of the 
plan. The bonus was to be paid on the basis of réductions in the number of 
days production opérations were behind schedule. The anchor point for cal-
culation was the "average days behind schedule as of March 1, 1968", 
which was stated as 22 days. If the number of days behind schedule was not 
reduced, there would be no bonus. When work was completely on schedule, 
the bonus would be 12 cents per hour worked. The relationship between a 
réduction in "average days behind schedule" and the bonus payment was 
linear. The figure for *'average days behind schedule" was determined by 
dividing the total number of days that work in process was behind schedule 
by the total number of orders in work. 
* Revised bonus rates in effect. 
** Significant employment increase late in period affected the average bonus paid figure. 
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In practice, the Productivity Improvement Plan was intended to make 
employées more schedule conscious, to help them assign priorities to jobs 
that were most pressing. For example, a machinist, completing one job 
would not sélect from the pending work the easiest new job to do, but rather 
take the job that was behind schedule or which was due out of the shop 
soon. In gênerai, work which needed to be done to keep production on 
schedule would be done first. The Productivity Improvement Plan was 
based on conditions which were highly visible to the individual employée. 
The worker could tell from the amount of work waiting to be processed if 
opérations were on schedule. If there was no backlog, or if thèse production 
orders on material to be processed indicated that the schedule was being 
met, the worker knew he was earning his bonus. 
The plan went into effect on March 1, 1968, Improvements in produc-
tivity, i.e., a réduction in the number of days production was behind sched-
ule, began in the first month of opération. The bonus for March, 1968 was 
two cents per hour. By July, the bonus (and corresponding réductions in 
average days behind schedule) had reached five cents per hour, and the 
bonus paid in July was $19. per employée. The December 1968 bonus pay-
ment was $40. per employée. By the next July, the bonus payment had 
reached $56. per employée, and in December of 1969 was $71. per em-
ployée. In July 1970, the bonus payment was $86. 
CHALLENGE 
But ail was not well with P.I.P. Within employée ranks, there were 
complaints that, although a bonus was being paid, nobody could satisfac-
torily explain in détail how the bonus was calculated. That is, no one on the 
union side knew how the figure "total days behind schedule on work in pro-
cess" was being calculated. The suggestion was made that some delays in 
work were due solely to managerial error, but that employées were paying 
the penalty for thèse errors in terms of a reduced bonus. In the élection cam-
paign, the union leadership was challenged by a group who said that the in-
cumbent administration had not pressured management for enough infor-
mation or for enough management action in increasing productivity. 
On the other hand, some management personnel were expressing réser-
vations about the plan. Some claimed that the plan was an administrative 
burden. Others said that the plan really did not measure increases in pro-
ductivity. Thèse individuals pointed out that réductions in the average num-
ber of days behind schedule (and increases in the amount of the bonus) 
could be accomplished by using an excess number of employées or by in-
creasing the amount of overtime worked. Uncorrected changes in the sched-
ule itself could lead to changes in the P.I.P. index and the bonus. There was 
sortie sentiment for developing a plan based on a more accurate measure of 
productivity increases. 
A management study of the plan and its alternatives led to a décision to 
continue with the plan. Despite its short-comings, the company believed 
that the plan had increased productivity, had helped improve the union-
management relationship, had improved the company's "on-schedule" 
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position, and had helped develop a spirit of teamwork, ail without the nor-
mal problems associated with work measurement. The parent company, 
General Dynamics, was also interested in seeing the plan continue and 
hoped to see it or one like it applied elsewhere in the organization. 
However, when the 1970 negotiations began, the new union leadership 
demanded that P.I.P. be discontinued. They cited ail of the objections men-
tioned above as the reasons for their demand. As a resuit of negotiations, 
the plan was not discontinued, but management acted to meet the union ob-. 
jections to the opération of the plan. The formula was modified, so as to 
more accurately reflect employée contributions. More complète informa-
tion and more substantial responses to union suggestions for production 
opérations modifications were promised. 
The new contract was for 18 months. The agreement provided for a 40 
cent wage increase over the life of contract. Pension benefits were increased 
by 15 percent. For the first time, the French language version of the agree-
ment became the "officiai" version. Two paid holidays were added, and the 
parties agreed to work out a new seniority System. The new System (whose 
exact dimensions were not known at the time the contract was signed) was 
to allow for the application of seniority for layoffs and recalls on a wider 
basis than had previously been the case. Over the next two years, the parties 
developed the new seniority System, building "job families" out of very 
narrow job catégories. This new System was developed during a most diffi-
cult period when the entire aerospace industry was in a sharp décline and 
Canadair, as a conséquence, was in the process of laying off some 4,000 em-
ployées. 
THE REVISED PLAN 
The basis for calculating the P.I.P. formula was changed during 1970 
negotiations. The basic formula of total days behind schedule on work in 
process divided by the total number of production orders in work was not 
altered. However, the method of calculating the number of days behind 
schedule was refined and made more explicit. 
The plant was divided into four areas and each area was given a num-
ber of "flow days" as a standard. Flow days were simply an average for the 
number of days parts were in a department for processing. Work would not 
be considered behind schedule until it had been in the area longer than the 
standard number of "flow days" and was actually behind schedule. The 
areas and the standard flow days for each were as follows: 
Machine Shop Departments — 45 Flow Days 
Sheet Métal Departments — 35 Flow Days 
Sub-Assembly Departments — 20 Flow Days 
Final Line (Assembly) — 5 Flow Days 
The flow times were developed by the company's industrial engineering 
department. Any condition which caused work to be held up, which was 
outside the control of the hourly worker — such as a tool being repaired, or 
materials being unavailable — was not to be counted on as part of the stan-
dard number of flow days for a location. 
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This modification menât that employées would not be continously 
penalized for work which was behind schedule. Under the old formula, 
work which entered a department behind schedule and left it still behind 
schedule did not resuit in a bonus. Under the new formula, work which 
passed through the department within the allowed number of flow days pro-
duced a bonus. 
The changes in the measurement placed responsibility on the employée 
to identify work which could not be processed due to conditions beyond his 
control. For example, work which could not proceed because of a lack of 
materials or work which needed engineering modifications had to be 
"clocked-out" on the production — control system. If it were not 
"clocked-out" then it would be computed as being in production for bonus 
purposes. 
The changes made the bonus standard more "measurable" and delays 
not caused by bargaining-unit employées more identifiable. Data on perfor-
mance to flow-times as well as the existence of off-standard conditions were 
produced by the computer-based shop control system, with some manual 
corrections. This data was made available to the joint union-management 
committee. The P.I.P. index from which bonus payments were determined 
was based on the total of past due days (adding together the total number of 
production time in excess of allowed flow days in Machine Shop, Sheet 
Métal, Sub-Assembly and Final Line) divided by the total number of orders 
in process. 
The bonus was also increased during negotiations. The maximum 
bonus payments were raised to 20 cents per hour from the previous 12 cents 
per hour. At the time the contract was signed, the bonus was about 9 1/2 
cents per hour. Under the old agreement, the bonus rate was about .5 cents 
per hour for every one day réduction in the number of days behind sched-
ule. However, only improvements in production to schedule above the level 
which existed at the time the contract was signed would be paid at the higher 
rate. 
At this time, the P.I.P. administrator was changed. The new adminis-
trator was a former union président. This individual had left the bargaining 
unit to work in the company's production control department after the 1968 
negotiations. He brought with him to the job of P.I.P. représentative a 
knowledge of and friendship with members of the union executive and a 
knowledge of the shop control system which was the basis of P.I.P. mea-
surement. 
THE SECOND TWO YEARS 
The 1970 agreement provided for the plan's continuance for two more 
years. Recalling the first part of this second period in the life of the plan, the 
parties had two major recollections about their behaviour on the joint com-
mittee which administered the plan. First, the union members were highly 
critical of management actions which reduced efficiency and the level of 
bonus payments. This criticism was highly vocal and quite caustic at times. 
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Managements response, in gênerai, was to attempt not to be défensive or 
reply in kind. In part, they realized that there were inefficient practices in 
the company. The parties also faced problems of interpreting and under-
standing of the information the shop control system was producing. Man-
agement had quite an educational job to do with union représentatives in 
terms of the operational significance of shop control system information. 
Over time, the intensity of union complaints softened and the atmosphère 
became, and has continued to be, more problem-solving in nature. 
On the other hand, the union did not insist that ail the changes which 
they sought, needed to be made immediately. Changes in Systems methods 
or procédures could not easily be made overnight. The union was willing to 
accept some delays in implementation, with the promise that corrections 
would be made as soon as practicable. 
In gênerai, the parties' behaviour showed a growing acceptance of the 
realities that each side faced. The company accepted the fact that union of-
ficers made certain statements or demands because of the political pressures 
they faced. The union, on the other hand, realized that organizational reali-
ties affected the ability of the company to make some changes quickly. 
In gênerai, the flow of information from the company to the union and 
employées increased during this period. To a great extent, the increases in 
information were the resuit of the increasing sophistication of the shop con-
trol system. The change in the measurement of the bonus and its intégration 
with the shop control system meant that detailed information on the opéra-
tion of the plan — on a job order number and department basis, was availa-
ble to the parties on a weekly basis. The new measuring system highlighted 
problem areas, and information on why problems were developing could be 
passed on through the joint committee to employées. 
The union administration pursued a policy of keeping the membership 
fully informed. This meant that they fully explained ail of their negotiation 
stances with the company, any grievance problems, and any information on 
the working of P.I.P. This policy also meant that the union executive at-
tempted to answer any questions the membership had. They used the joint 
committee to get information from management. According to the union 
officers, the company was very responsive in providing the information re-
quested: information on the plan, on the production control system on 
scheduling, as well as on miscellaneous matters. 
Bonus payments continued to increase — because the bonus was higher 
and because production to schedule continued to improve. Perhaps the 
most amazing aspect of the improvements in "on schedule" performance 
was the fact that the improvement occurred in the face of massive layoffs at 
Canadair. From 1970 to 1972, about 4,000 hourly employées were laid off 
so that by mid-1972, less than 1,000 workers were employed in the bargain-
ing unit. The normal tendency in a workforce might be expected to be to 
make the available work last longer. This behaviour did not seem to materi-
alize at Canadair, at least to any greater extent. 
As mentioned earlier, the parties developed a new seniority system 
while the layoffs were being made. They did this by what could be described 
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as a continuous-bargaining process. Agreement on regrouping of existing 
jobs was reached first. Fréquent meetings folio wed in which the operational 
détails including the application of the System to specified situations, défini-
tions, and training and re-training programs were hammered out. The pro-
cess was oriented toward problem-solving and real disagreements were rare. 
Only two or three grievances resulted from the continuous negotiation-
layoff process, and none of the grievances reached arbitration. The parties 
believed that their ability to renegotiate the seniority System as they did 
stemmed in a large part from their prior expérience and success with P.I.P. 
FURTHER MODIFICATION 
A new collective agreement was signed in July, 1972. The contract pro-
vided for a fifty cent wage increase over the two-year agreement. Group in-
surance and pension benefits were also increased. 
The maximum bonus payable under the Productivity Improvement 
Plan was increased from 20 cents to 25 cents. As had been the case in the 
1970 modification, the increased rate would be paid only for improvements 
in the scheduled position beyond that which had already been achieved. The 
allô wed flow times were also reduced. The "flow time" standard was reduc-
ed from 45 to 40 days in machine shop departments, from 35 to 31 days in 
sheet métal departments, from 20 to 17 days in sub-assembly departments 
and from 5 days to 3 days in the final assembly line. 
The changes were made to allow for a continuing incentive in the 
P.I.P. system. At the time the agreement was signed, production was close 
to being completely "on time". The parties believed that continued pro-
gress would be more difficult and that an extra incentive would be needed to 
insure a movement to a completely on-schedule position. Also, increases in 
the P.I.P. bonus helped to maintain the relationship between the bonus and 
regular hourly wages which had also been increased. The changes in the 
flow time standards changed the définition of "on time" performance, but 
the changes were in line with the actual flow times the parties had been ex-
periencing under the plan. 
In late 1972, the tooling opérations were measured in the opération of 
P.I.P. for the first time. Until this time, the volume of work in the tool 
manufacture area had not warranted the measuring of work in this area. 
The inclusion of the tooling area was timed so that its impact on the total 
bonus would be minimized. The intégration of the tooling area was success-
ful in two ways: the tooling section "on schedule" performance was satis-
factory and the overall production to schedule continued to show improve-
ment. The December 1972 bonus was about $200. per employée, which 
meant that opérations were only three days behind schedule. 
In addition, a spécial payment of 3 cents per hour to employées with 20 
years or more of service was made. The rationale for this change was that 
the expérience of the more senior workers allowed them to make a greater 
contribution to productivity increases. The extra bonus reflected this belief. 
In another way, the P.I.P. bonus became a vehicle for rewarding senior 
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workers that could not be accomplished through the regular wage system. 
That wage system provided that the maximum rate in each job classification 
would be paid after one year on a job. 
1974 CHANGES 
In the negotiations for the 1974 collective agreement, the Productivity 
Improvement Plan was expanded to include bonus payments for improve-
ments other than production to schedule. The rate of bonus payment for 
schedule improvement was again increased and the number of flow days 
allowed was again reduced. 
The agreement was for 24 months and provided for wage increases up 
to a 32 percent over its term. The contract also provided for significant in-
creases in the level of disability benefits and for pension increases of 10 to 
20 percent. The settlement reflected the inflationary times just prior to the 
imposition of wage and profit controls by the Libéral Government. 
The pressure faced by the parties for real income protection was not 
dissimilar to that which they faced in 1968. Production was within 2.5 days 
(on average) of flow schedule, and little significant improvement in sched-
ule position or earnings from the P.I.P. formula could realistically be ex-
pected. Given the company's reluctance to agrée to a cost-of-living provi-
sion, and the parties success and satisfaction with P.I.P., the move to pro-
viding bonus payments for factors in addition to schedule improvement was 
quite rational. 
The factors chosen were the suggestion plan, programme excellence (a 
quality improvement plan) and accident prévention. For some time prior to 
1974, Canadair had been involved in programmative attempts to achieve in-
creases in employée suggestions (with payments of 10 percent of the first-
year savings paid to employées), to increase product quality, and to reduce 
accidents. Management believed that the Productivity Improvement Plan 
and the teamwork that it generated had helped to reinforce thèse efforts. 
One index was developed for suggestions, two for accidents and one 
for programme excellence. The index for suggestions was: 1) The Monthly 
Value of Savings resulting from suggestions per 100 employées. At $500. 
savings per 100 employées, the bonus payable was five cents per hour work-
ed — the maximum bonus payable. At $100. savings per 100 employées, the 
bonus was 1 cent per hour worked. The bonus was designed to be self-
sufficient, with approximately $.76 of each dollar saved, paid back to em-
ployées and $.24 retained by the company for the administration of the 
plan. 
The formula for the programme excellence élément in P.I.P. provided 
a bonus based on réductions on the monthly repair, replacement, and re-
work costs (both material and labour) per employée. At a $12.60 average 
dollar cost of repair, rework, and replacement, the bonus value was zéro. 
At $2.50 per employée, the bonus paid its maximum value of ten cents per 
hour worked. In essence, this élément paid a bonus to employées for reduc-
ing the cost of human error. This élément was also self-sufficient with about 
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$.71 of each dollar saving paid back to employées, with the remainder re-
tained by the company. 
For accident prévention, bonus formulas were developed to measure 
and reward decreases in accident frequency and severity. For accident fre-
quency, the formula had the total number of disabling accidents per month 
times 1 million hours divided by the total number of man hours worked dur-
ing the month. At a frequency of 8.1 or greater, no bonus was paid. At a 
zéro frequency rate, the bonus paid was 5 cents. An index for accident se-
verity was developed based on the total number of days charged as due to 
last time accidents during a month times 1 million hours divided by the total 
number of man hours worked during a month. A severity rate of 81.0 or 
higher produced no bonus, while a severity rate of zéro produced the maxi-
mum bonus payment of 5 cents. 
The safety indexes represented an attempt to reduce the frequency and 
severity of accidents at Canadair to a level more consistent with that at the 
parent company (General Dynamics) and with the aerospace industry in 
gênerai. For example, for the first nine months of 1974, Canadair accident 
frequency rate (for hourly employées) was 16.49 compared to 8.86 for ail 
General Dynamics employées and 2.52 for ail employées in the U.S. aero-
space industry. The Canadair production employées' accident severity rate 
was 225, while that for ail General Dynamics employées was 123.37 and ail 
U.S. aerospace employées was 170. 
The maximum bonus payable for schedule improvements was also in-
creased in the 1974 negotiations from 25 cents to 30 cents. At the same time, 
the number of flow-days allowed was reduced by 20 percent. At the time of 
the change, production was running about 2-3 days past due to flow 
schedule. 
Also in 1974, the seniority bonus payable to employées with more than 
20 years' service was increased from $80 per year to $200; a bonus was add-
ed for employées of 10 or more years' service at $100 per year. 
Shortly after the negotiation of the 1974 agreement, employment at 
Canadair fell to its lowest level in récent years, reaching a bottom of about 
650 employées late in 1974. The number of employées remained below 1,000 
until 1977. 
Prior to the 1974 changes, production employées at Canadair were 
earning about 85 percent of the maximum possible bonus. The 1974 changes 
(excluding the seniority bonus) doubled the amount potentially available in 
bonuses. Improvements continued to be made in performance to schedule, 
with average days past due to flow schedule falling below 2 days in 1975, to 
an average of 1.6 days. 
Performance in the areas measured by the new bonus éléments — sug-
gestions, safety, and quality control — was similar to that experienced in 
the early days of P.I.P., that is, there were no dramatic increases in perfor-
mance, but rather steady improvement in ail areas. The new éléments, 
understandably, added more variability to the bonus payments. Months 
with no accidents were recorded, providing the maximum possible bonus 
for those measures. By 1976, after two years' expérience with the additional 
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bonus éléments, production employées were earning the same percentage ot 
maximum bonus (86 percent in June 1976) as they were prior to the intro-
duction of the new éléments. Over the two year period, the amount paid per 
hour in bonuses continued to increase. 
1976 AND 1978 CHANGES 
In 1976, a one-year collective agreement was signed, which included 
further changes in the Productivity Improvement Plan. A wage increase of 
from 8.8 to 9.7 percent and a provision for three weeks paid vacation after 5 
years' service (reduced from the previous requirement of 10 years' service) 
were the other major changes in the agreement. 
The maximum productivity bonus payable was increased from 50 cents 
per hour to 70 cents per hour. This was done by increasing the bonus paya-
ble under programme excellence from 5 cents to 10 cents, and by adding two 
new éléments to the bonus formula. Thèse were 1) The number of accepted 
suggestions submitted under the suggestion program in a month. This élé-
ment paid a maximum of 5 cents at 1.1 suggestions per 100 employées per 
month, at .1 suggestions, and 1 cent at .3 suggestions. And 2) The number 
of consécutive accident-free days, which paid a maximum bonus of 10 cents 
per hour. The seniority bonuses were also increased to $150. for those with 
10-20 years' service, and $300. for employées with 20 or more years' service. 
The one-year agreement signed in 1977 provided for wage increases 
ranging from 7.8 percent to 8.5 percent. The agreement also provided for 
paid vacations of 4 weeks after 15 years (reduced from 20), increases in 
health and welfare benefits and increases in pension benefits of 10 to 20 per-
cent. No changes were made in the Productivity Improvement Plan. 
The formai end of the Fédéral Government's income control program 
also brought a return of a multi-year agreement to Canadair in 1978. The 
three-year agreement signed in mid-year provided for immédiate wage in-
creases ranging from 9.4 to 10.7 percent, and for increases of from 5.9 to 
7.1 percent in 1979 and from 6.2 to 7.4 percent in 1980. Shift premiums 
were doubled to 30 and 50 cents for second and third shift work. Also, a 
reporting pay provision was added to the contract; five weeks of vacation 
were provided to employées with 25 or more years of service; improvements 
were made in health and welfare provisions, and pension benefits for em-
ployées with 25 or more years service were increased. The company also 
agreed to contribute one cent per hour worked to a union training fund. 
Changes were also made to the Productivity Plan bonus. The parties 
were not satisfied with the usefulness of the *'number of consécutive 
accident-free days" measure which had been added two years earlier. In-
stead, they decided to increase the bonus amounts payable under the acci-
dent frequency and severity measures to 10 and 15 cents per hour worked, 
respectively. The factor dropped had a maximum value of 10 cents per 
hour, while the additions were worth a maximum of 15 cents (a five cent in-
crease to the frequency factor and a 10 cent increase to the severity factor). 
This brought the total potential productivity bonus payable from 70 to 75 
cents per hour worked. 
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In addition, the définition involved in the élément measuring the num-
ber of suggestions submitted was changed from the number of accepted sug-
gestions submitted to the number of acceptable suggestions. This change 
was an attempt to more quickly reflect useful suggestions in the bonus cal-
culations. The investigation and formai acceptance of suggestions was a 
time-consuming process, and the parties believed that the change would 
allow the bonus to more accurately reflect suggestion activity in a given 
month at a time closer to the actual incidence of the suggestion activity. The 
changes also allowed for the measurement of useful suggestions that might 
for various reasons not be capable of being implemented. 
The 1978 agreement also provided a 10 percent (8 cents) increase in the 
total potential bonus payable on July 1, 1979, bringing that total to 83C and 
another 10 percent (8 cents) on July 1, 1980. Thèse increases would serve to 
maintain the relationship between bonus payments and wage levels in the 
plant. 
1980 REVISIONS 
In 1980, changing conditions produced an early reopening of the col-
lective agreement at Canadair and changes in P.I.P. Changes in the 
Montréal labour market, particularly in the aerospace sector, acted to 
worsen Canadair's market portion. Employment increases at the Air 
Canada aircraft maintenance opération and at other aircraft companies 
helped to increase wage levels, weakening Canadair's relative position and 
tended to increase turnover. The passage of Bill 17 in the Québec Législative 
Assembly tended to reduce the incentive for improvements in safety perfor-
mance, at least according to Canadair and the local Union. 
As a conséquence, the parties agreed to drop the two safety éléments 
from the Productivity Improvement Plan, rolling the 30 cent bonus into 
base wage rates as of July 1, 1980. New bonus éléments were to be added to 
replace the éléments which were dropped. For a variety of factors, the intro-
duction of new bonus éléments was delayed until after this writing, to at the 
earliest, July 1981. The gênerai wage increase scheduled for January 1981 
was advanced to October 1, 1980. 
In December of 1980, the collective agreement was re-opened six 
months early. The new agreement begun January 1, 1981 had an expiry date 
of July, 1982. Wage increases of 9.9 percent over the life of the agreement 
were negotiated. In order to maintain the relative size of the P.I.P. bonus in 
relation to wages, an automatic 1 percent per month adjustment factor was 
added to the bonus formula. 
A new bonus, called the Attendance Improvement Formula was cre-
ated. They paid a bonus of 30 cents per hour for each week in which a full 
40 hours (excluding overtime) was worked. A bonus of 15 cents per hour 
was paid for weeks in which no more than 2.5 hours of work were missed. 
Below that level of attendance/tardiness no bonus was paid. The attendance 
bonus was paid quarterly, separate from the P.I.P. bonus. 
THE CANADAIR-I.A.M. PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT PLAN 191 
RESULTS TO DATE 
By the time the 1980 agreement expires, the Productivity Improvement 
Plan will hâve been in opération at Canadair for fourteen years. The plan 
has withstood the test of time, of radical changes in the employment level, 
in products, and in ownership. By thèse measures, the plan has been suc-
cessful. The parties are clearly committed to it. 
From the employées' standpoint, over $12 million in bonus payments 
(excluding the seniority bonus) hâve been received. From the company's 
standpoint, the opération of the productivity bonus System has cost less 
than a straight cost-of-living agreement would hâve. This is true because the 
productivity bonus is paid only on hours worked and not on hours paid, 
and because wage levels at Canadair hâve been adjusted less frequently than 
they would hâve effectively been had a typical cost-of-living agreement been 
part of the collective agreement. 
This is not to say that overall, Canadair workers hâve suffered déclines 
in real income. For example, between July 1968 and July 1979, the Con-
sumer Price Index increased by 113 percent. Wages at Canadair over that 
time increased from 137 to 185 percent. When the productivity bonus 
figures are added to hourly wages, the increases in total wage levels at 
Canadair in the 1968-79 period rise to between 155 and 214 percent. In con-
trast, average weekly earnings in Canadian manufacturing during the same 
period increased by 171 percent. 
Under the opération of the plan, the company has achieved significant 
improvements in its capacity to manufacture to schedule, improving its 
reliability as a contractor and sub-contractor. The Productivity Improve-
ment Plan has reinforced and helped improve the company's quality and 
safety records, and via the suggestion plan éléments has helped to improve 
manufacturing efficiency. 
The plan has produced thèse results not only by offering hourly em-
ployées financial incentives for "working smarter", but also by serving as a 
vehicle for helping management to identify problem areas or situations 
which are crucial to its manufacturing or employée relations objectives. 
In this context, it is important to note that the bonus calculations at 
Canadair are not produced in a purely mechanical fashion. The data upon 
which the bonus is based are subjected to manual correction by the plan's 
administrator, and to, at times, negotiations between the parties. Work 
delayed because of a management décision or because of considérations 
outside of management or worker control may not be counted as late or 
behind schedule for bonus calculation purposes. 
The opération of the Productivity Improvement Plan is, as evidenced 
by the above, strongly conditioned by the nature of the union-management 
relationship at Canadair, and has, in turn, strongly influenced that relation-
ship. Certainly the nature of the relationship prior to 1958 does not provide 
much évidence that the successful opération of P.I.P. was even a remote 
possibility. The history of P.I.P. at Canadair suggests that while its initial 
adoption served particular needs which existed at the time, the expériences 
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of the parties with the plan hâve helped demonstrate and reinforce the 
mutual benefits obtainable from an accommodative and even coopérative 
orientation. 
The union-management relationship at Canadair is characterized by a 
great deal of daily give and take interaction, by a fairly high level of com-
munication and understanding. Just as the Productivity Improvement Plan 
is innovative, its opération has helped the parties develop other innovative 
approaches to employée relations as well. 
An example of an innovative approach is the Attendance Improvement 
Formula developed during 1978 contract negotiations. The program was 
developed in response to a union demand for paid sick leave or paid Per-
sonal leave (for situations not covered by workman's compensation or long-
term disability benefits). The company was initially hésitant to provide what 
might corne to be viewed as additional paid holidays — or days of entitle-
ment. The formula ultimately worked out through negotiations provided up 
to 5 days (in the second year of the contract) of "attendance crédits" which 
could be used by an employée for personal absences, which would be com-
pensated for at a rate of 66 2/3 percent of his normal daily wage. At the end 
of a year, ail employées with unused "attendance crédits", would be paid 
for twice the number of those unused crédits at 66 2 / 3 percent of his normal 
daily wage rate. The year end figures are calculated on November 30, so 
that the payment for unused personal leave days is made prior to Christmas 
along with the payment of the P.I.P. bonus. 
As another example of innovation, in late 1979, Canadair began a new 
fitness and récréation program for its employées. Under this program, the 
company spends money to subsidize fées and provide equipment and facili-
ties for fitness and récréation, while the employées provide the informai 
structure, including coaches and organizers. The program has met with an 
unusually enthusiastic réception among employées in its early stages, with, 
for example, over 350 individuals participating in a broomball league. The 
company hopes to use the fitness program to provide exercices for employ-
ées with conditions such as weak backs which makes them prone to acci-
dents or injuries at work. 
The fitness program was combined with product improvement in an 
unusual program in the last six months of 1980. In an attempt to reduce fuel 
consumption and increase the range of the Challenger, in response to chan-
ges in the energy situation which had occurred since the plane's inception, 
the company began a campaign to reduce the aircraft's weight. As an incen-
tive for employée suggestions to that end, the company offered a bonus of 
$1 per pound per plane sold for each accepted suggestion. As a companion 
program, the company offered each employée $1 per pound of individual 
weight loss over a six-month period and $2 per pound if the employée reach-
ed his idéal weight. 
The two programs resulted in a 3,000 pound réduction in the weight of 
the aircraft and a loss of six tons in the weight of employées! An added 
bonus from the company's perspective was an increased awareness on the 
part of employées of the conséquences on fuel efficiency of unnecessary 
drag in an aircraft, resulting from such manufacturing factors as rivets set a 
few thousandths of an inch off the idéal. 
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Another example of an innovative approach to a problem can be seen 
in the company's appointment of an hourly-rated employée, and member of 
the union executive, as a safety inspector or safety ombudsman. The indivi-
dual has been assigned the job of investigating and reporting on safety com-
plaints, of working informally with lead hands to improve safety perfor-
mances, of keeping the union informed as to progress toward solving safety 
problems, and cutting red tape in their solution whenever possible. 
Another area in which the impact of the union-management relation-
ship and the opération of P.I.P. can be seen is in the grievance rate. Prior to 
1968, there were 60 to 80 formai grievances per year, while in 1980 the num-
ber of formai grievances was 5 or 6 per year. There were no grievance arbi-
trations from 1971 through 1978. In 1979, three grievances were taken to ar-
bitration. The low grievance rate existed even though employées were repre-
sented by company-paid, full-time grievance committeemen. The union es-
timâtes that 90 percent of employée complaints, questions, or problems are 
handled during an initial investigation, a further 7-8 percent are handled at 
the informai complaint, i.e., verbal stage; and another 10 percent in a week-
ly union-industrial relations staff meeting; leaving only 2 or 3 percent to 
émerge as formai, written grievances. 
Aside from the tangible benefits of the plan, the opération of P.I.P. 
has provided some obvious psychological benefits. The parties clearly évi-
dence a sensé of accomplishment. They not only believe that they hâve 
achieved increases in productivity, but improvements in working together. 
Employées are given a chance to contribute, and their contributions are 
recognized. 
Ail is not necessarily sweetness and light, however. The opération of 
the plan does create stresses between the plan's administrator and the union 
and various other functional areas, including both line and staff groups in 
production. However, the focus of P.I.P. is to improve opérations, and 
such improvements are not likely to corne easily, without some internai con-
flicts. 
The continued existence of the plan over 14 years (at least until the 1982 
expiry of the 1980 agreement) can be seen as évidence that the parties are 
satisfied with it. Employée acceptance of the plan and of their union's rôle 
in it, can be seen in the fact that the entire union executive was returned to 
office by acclamation in 1972, 1975, 1978, and 1980. 
In the gênerai climate of labour relations in Canada and in Québec in 
particular, the fact that the Productivity Improvement Plan at Canadair has 
operated as long as it has and as well as it has is indeed an accomplishment. 
The historical willingness and ability of the parties to make changes in the 
plan has no doubt been a significant factor in its longevity. This flexibility 
probably is the greatest guarantee that the plan will continue to operate in 
the future. 
ANALYSIS OF THE PLAN 
The foliowing discussion, although not exhaustive, appears to the 
author to highlight the key factors responsible for the success of the plan. 
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Thèse points should be of concern to anyone interested in introducing a 
similar plan elsewhere, in that certain conditions probably need to be met 
before such a plan can hâve a reasonable chance for success. 
First of ail, the initial measurement basis for determining changes in 
productivity was uniquely suited to Canadair. The nature of the production 
opération in the company was a complex manufacturing and assembly 
opération — to very high standards — that resulted in a very small number 
of finished products. The proper scheduling or sequencing of manufac-
turing and assembly opérations was crucial to final success. At the time the 
plan was introduced, the company was not operating on schedule, and its 
inability to operate on schedule was having a négative effect on the com-
pany. 
The adoption of a bonus scheme based on improvements in schedule 
position thus made a great deal of sensé in terms of both the nature of 
opérations and the particular problems the company was facing. A similar 
measurement of productivity would not be very useful elsewhere. In short, 
the measurement basis must suit the situation. 
Aside from thèse considérations, the parties both hadstrong needs that 
could be met by the plan. At the time the plan was first introduced in 1968, 
the union faced a demand for some kind of bonus to replace a spécial cost-
of-living bonus that ended with the close of Expo. The company faced a 
great deal of pressure from many sources to increase productivity. If thèse 
pressures had not existed, the parties might never hâve attempted to set up a 
plan like P.I.P. 
The éléments that were added to the program in 1974 and subséquent 
years, were based on existing company programs in the case of the sugges-
tion plan and programme excellence, and on an area of concern to both the 
company and the union in the measures regarding safety. The parties not 
only had had some gênerai prior expérience with the measures, but improve-
ments in the areas newly included in the productivity bonus plan had a pay-
off clearly related to productivity for both parties. The parties' willingness 
to add new bonus éléments was no doubt conditioned by their success with 
the original schedule — improvement factor. The inclusion of the new élé-
ments also allowed for an escalation in bonus payments, which was particu-
larly critical since continuing improvements in performance to schedule 
promised to be difficult and marginal after 1974, and the size of bonus pay-
ments relative to hourly earnings needed to be kept at a level that could 
maintain employée interest in the plan, particularly at a time when infla-
tionary pressures were strong. 
Thus, the fact that the amount of bonus payments has always increased 
can also be said to be a critical élément in the success of the plan. The in-
crease has been a resuit of increases in performance in the éléments mea-
sured by the bonus formula, by the addition of éléments, and increases in 
the bonus rate. The net effect has been that continued increases in perfor-
mance hâve been increasingly rewarded, and that there hâve been real incen-
tives for continued improvement. 
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The plan always haspaid a bonus. Even when the union and individual 
employées did not completely understand the new shop control system and 
how the bonus was being calculated, they could accept the plan because it 
was providing a payout, and because they could see the amount of work 
that was either on schedule or behind schedule. From the very beginning, 
the bonuses indicated that progress could be made and that progress would 
resuit in financial benefit to employées, if nothing else. The existence of 
bonus payments has always had a self-reinforcing impact on the plan. 
The bonyspayment method hasproved bénéficiai. By paying the bonus 
only twice a year, the total amount paid has been of fairly significant size. 
The first bonus was only $19. per employée, but this was only after then it 
would hâve been had it simply been added to weekly paychecks. Of course, 
the récent bonuses of $650. hâve had an even greater impact. The bonus is 
paid at times when the money is generally more useful and thus more mea-
ningful: just before the summer vacation shutdown and at Christmas. 
When coupled with the spécial seniority bonus, the bonus payments in 1980 
were $1,400. for some employées. As one union spokesman said, "How 
many opportunities does a typical blue collar worker hâve to accumulate 
$1,000? He can do that hère." 
Despite the size of the bonus in récent times, the Productivity Improve-
ment Plan and the bonuses paid thereunder hâve not been a substitute adé-
quate contract seulement. The 1968 agreement, in which P.I.P. had its 
beginnings provided for wage levels at Canadair which were equal to those 
paid in other heavy, manufacturing opérations. Ail of the following settle-
ments appear to be in Une with settlements that were being negotiated else-
where in Canadian manufacturing. In this sensé, the P.I.P. bonus was an 
"extra" that accrued to employées as a resuit of their performance. It was 
not a substitute for lower-than-average increases in wage and fringe benefits 
although it was a substitute for a cost-of-living clause. Thus, in one sensé, 
initially the employées did not hâve that much to lose if the plan did not 
work well. Since it has worked well, their gains hâve been greater than other 
workers in other companies. 
The plan was also ideologically acceptable to the union. The union had 
traditionally opposed piecework incentive plans, and they wanted nothing 
to do with anything that smacked of "sweat shop" conditions. They oper-
ated under the assumption that the membership already was providing the 
company with a fair day's work. The plan implied that people work 
"smarter" but not "harder" and on this basis was acceptable to the union. 
The plan was based on conditions which were well-known and highly 
visible to employées. With regard to the initial performance to schedule élé-
ment, workers had always been aware of the need to operate on schedule. 
They knew when jobs were both on schedule and not on schedule, and they 
could tell by just looking around them whether they were earning a bonus. 
Thus employée faith in the plan was not based only on financial or produc-
tion data, but on conditions they could actually observe. The suggestion 
safety, and quality work éléments were similarly under employée observa-
tion and control. 
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The informality of the proceedings has also been a help. Since the 
plan's inception, ail proceedings hâve been informai and "off the record". 
Within this informai relationship, information can be exchanged, proposais 
made, criticisms and suggestions can be offered, without any definite com-
mitment on behalf of either of the parties to a particular course of action or 
without the danger that sensitive information or comments might become 
gênerai knowledge. 
The plan does not operate in a vacuum; it opérâtes as part of a larger 
union-management relationship. The ability of the parties to work well in 
gênerai, helps to makeP.I.P. work well. In this relationship, the parties évi-
dence a strong désire to handle ail problems quickly and informally. Com-
munications between the parties are extremely good. The union leadership 
is careful to communicate fully to its membership. 
One of the factors which has helped the plan to operate well has been 
the particular individuals on both sides of the table. The leadership ofboth 
union and management has been very strong. Both union and management 
hâve shown a great deal of ability in dealing with each other and with mem-
bers of their relative constituencies. The plan would probably not hâve con-
tinued to operate well had it not been for the personalities and ability of the 
people directly involved with it. Also, the leadership on both sides has been 
relatively stable. That is, there hâve not been many personnel changes in 
critical positions, in either the union or the management. 
One factor of possible importance was the massive layoffs at Canadair. 
On one hand, they possibly generated some concern over the company's 
health on the part of employées. On the other hand, the layoffs meant that 
younger, more militant employées were not part of the workforce for an ex-
tended period as the plan matured. Thèse younger employées might hâve 
challenged the union leadership on the way the plan operated had they been 
présent. During a large portion of the time the plan has been operative, the 
membership of the local has been composed primarily of older, more stable 
workers, thus the union leadership job may hâve been easier and the opéra-
tion of the plan facilitated. 
Finally, the willingness to change the basis of bonus calculât ion has 
probably added to the life of and improved the opération of the plan. The 
method of bonus calculation was first changed in the 1970 negotiations. 
This change made the calculation more explicit and also insured that the 
employées were not charged with delays not of their making while making 
employées responsible for recording thèse delays in the production control 
System, while improving the information and the plan's acceptability. This 
change also made delays which were caused by other factors more observa-
ble and more likely to achieve attention from management. 
The subséquent adjustments in the bonus rate provided an incentive for 
continued improvement as the company's opérations moved closer to a ful-
ly on-schedule position and improvement became more difficult to achieve. 
The réduction in the flow times in 1972 and 1974 helped keep the plan real-
istic. The change from accepted to acceptable suggestions in 1978 was a 
similar move. 
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The flexibility in altering the formula has been reflected in its weekly 
and monthly application. The formula is not followed slavishly. Manual 
corrections and adjustments are made to reflect abnormal conditions cre-
ated by the company, and to keep the bonus as a motivator. 
Thèse appear to be the major factors influencing the success of P.I.P. 
at Canadair. Clearly, in many ways, the plan is unique, just as are the condi-
tions out of which it grew and in which it opérâtes. Nevertheless, the plan 
stands as évidence that if the parties are innovative, imaginative, and willing 
to work hard, coopération is as likely a resuit as is the conflict that is so 
much more widely known (if not truly experienced) under our présent in-
dustrial relations System. 
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